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I. Introduction
This paper identifies and analyzes the key factors involved in explaining 
the effectiveness of third-party mediation in internal armed conflicts in the 
contemporary world. It examines a set of interrelated hypotheses and findings 
well-established in the standard literature on third party mediation and evaluates 
their applicability to three case studies. 
The first hypothesis argues that contextual variables are more influential 
than process variables in determining the final outcome of mediation. The 
second hypothesis states that among the contextual variables of third party 
mediation, the characteristics of the mediator are the most influential. Finally, 
the third hypothesis stresses that among the characteristics of the mediator, the 
leverage of the mediator is the most important.
To examine these hypotheses and findings from the standard literature on 
the effectiveness of third party mediation, this study analyzes two cases from the 
southern Philippines and one from Indonesia. In all the three cases, international 
third-party mediators including governmental, intergovernmental and non-
governmental actors were involved in the mediation process. All the three cases 
revolve around the secessionist demands of Islamic armed movements in the 
two countries. 
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II. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
1. Definition of Mediation
Summarizing similarities among various definitions by researchers, 
mediation is defined as one form of an ad-hoc trial of conflict resolution in a 
non-forcible and non-legally-binding manner, which is practiced by the parties 
to the conflict and third parties as mediators (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992, pp.2, 
4-5, 7; Crocker, 2007, p.2; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999, pp.5, 7; Horowitz, 
2007, p.51; Williams & Williams, 1994, p.116).
2. Independent Variables
The independent variables for explaining the outcome of third party 
mediation may be classified into contextual and process variables. There is a 
large consensus in the standard literature on which factors are considered as 
contextual variables to explain the effectiveness of mediation (Bercovitch & 
Rubin, 1992, p.7). In this light, this study adopts Kleiboer’s way of classification 
(2006, pp.374-376).
Contextual variables consist of four categories: 1) the characteristics of 
the dispute, 2) the parties, 3) the mediator and 4) the international context. The 
characteristics of the dispute can be analyzed according to its ripeness, intensity, 
and issues at stake in the conflict. The nature of the parties involved in the 
conflict may be analyzed through six aspects: identification, cohesiveness, type 
of regime, motivation to mediate the conflicts, mutual relationship and power 
balance of the parties. The third contextual variable, the characteristics of the 
mediator, can be evaluated on three levels: impartiality, leverage and status of 
the mediator. The fourth contextual variable, the international context, focuses 
on the impact of significant international events and processes on the mediation 
activity.
As the second major independent variable, the process variable indicates 
the activeness of involvement of the mediator into the mediation process. From 
a passive role to an active role, the mediator may function as a communicator, 
formulator and manipulator of the mediation process.
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In reality, the characteristics of the mediator such as impartiality, leverage, 
and status (a contextual variable) dynamically relate to the behavior of the 
mediator (a process variable) but for analytical reasons, this paper treats these 
variables separately. In particular, the process variable highlights and evaluates 
the nature of agency intervention, as a passive communicator, formulator, or 
active manipulator of the mediation process. Thus, in the actual mediation 
process, there can be instances where the characteristics of the mediator are 
inconsistent with the level of its actual involvement in mediation. For instance, 
a mediator with significant leverage may not be able to play a more active 
manipulator role initially expected of it; or one seen with low leverage may in 
fact attempt a more active formulator or manipulator role.
(1) Characteristics of the Mediator
Since the existing literature argues that the characteristics of the mediator 
are the most influential among the contextual variables, there is a need to briefly 
explain what these characteristics are. 
a) Impartiality of the Mediator
Most studies show that among the characteristics of the mediator, 
impartiality has the least impact on the mediation outcome (Picco, 1997; 
Williams & Williams, 1994, pp.10-11, 111-112). However, the perceived 
impartiality of the mediator from the point of view of the contending parties is 
still one of the factors considered in their final choice of the mediator.
Actually, the required degree of impartiality of the mediator in mediation 
practices is not as rigid as often expected. Some researchers argue that “complete 
impartiality” is rare among mediators even in successful cases. Touval and 
Zartman (2001, p. 434) suggest that mediators have to be regarded merely as not 
so partial to either side. For the mediator to have a special connection with one 
side is not necessarily a reason for disqualification but could work positively. 
Williams and Williams (1994, pp.10-11, 111-112) claim that oftentimes it is 
necessary for the mediator to show such connections as a clue to their potential 
capability in influencing the mediation outcome. In reality, as Williams reports, 
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many local people in conflict sites have also been involved in mediation.
b) Leverage of the Mediator
Many studies show that a mediator’s  leverage, its power and resources  to 
influence the parties, is more important than its show of impartiality (Crocker, 
2007, pp.1-2; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999, pp.681, 693). Thus, the leverage, 
or simply what the mediator can do to alter the status quo, is more important 
than how the mediator is regarded by the parties. A great number of case studies 
argue that the mediator simply needs power for successful mediation (Crocker, 
2007, pp.1-2; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999, pp.681, 693). Nevertheless, 
according to Young (2006, p.142), most researchers do not conclude that the 
more physical power a mediator possesses, the more successful it can act. 
Instead, the combination of threatening and rewarding in return for parties’ 
fulfilling some expected behavior is a practical option for mediators to maximize 
their leverage based on limited resources, according to Touval, Zartman, Rubin 
and Crocker (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999, p.686; Rubin, 1992, p.255; 
Touval & Zartman, 2001, pp.437, 442).
c) Status of the Mediator
The status of the mediator has not been focused much by researchers as 
a primary determinant of mediation outcome as Crocker points out (Crocker, 
Hampson & Aall, 1999, p.693). However, the status of the mediator is as 
influential on the mediation outcome as its leverage, according to Bercovich and 
Williams, since the mediation process normally starts with the mediator being 
accepted by all the parties, based on how its status is perceived (Bercovitch 
& Langley, 2006, p.353; Williams & Williams, 1994, p.68). The status of the 
mediator may be understood as the initial position that a mediator brings to the 
process. It can be seen in at least three dimensions: as a state or non-state actor; 
as formal or informal mediator; and the initial prestige level of the mediator. 
There are increasingly prominent instances when non-state actors have played 
key roles in the mediation process as seen in the case of Aceh examined in this 
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paper. A formal status refers to a mediator whose role is publicly known and 
acknowledged while an informal role refers to one where the mediator is only 
known and acknowledged by the parties to the conflict. The prestige level as a 
component of the status of the mediator refers to its track record and credibility 
in participating and addressing conflicts. 
 (2) Process Condition as Independent Variable
Apart from contextual variables, the process condition also affects the 
outcome of mediation, since this variable indicates how the mediation process 
is conducted by the mediator in practice. The behavior of the mediator varies 
from “passive,” through “facilitative,” and to “active” as Bercovitch suggests. 
Touval and Zartman assert that mediators can act in at least three ways to 
influence the outcome of the process: 1) as a “communicator” who can bridge 
the parties who have no direct communication or little trust of each other; 2) as 
a “formulator” who encourages contesting parties to agree on the procedure of 
mediation by providing them with ideas on how to evaluate the conflict and to 
implement their agreements; and 3) as a “manipulator” who resorts to a certain 
kind of nonviolent power to change the behavior of the parties so that they can 
concentrate on conflict resolution through mediation (Bercovitch, 1992, p.8; 
Touval & Zartman, 2001, pp.435-436; Young, 2006, p.143).
However, researchers often argue that the process condition may exercise 
less influence over the mediation outcome than the contextual variables, and the 
characteristics of the mediator in particular, may do. They think that the conduct 
of the mediator in the mediation process cannot overturn the perceptions of the 
parties, who ultimately make decisions on the outcome, as these perceptions are 
determined in advance of the process by the context.
3. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of mediation theory is normally termed as the 
outcome of the mediation process. Kleiboer (2006, pp.360-361) argues that 
among various definitions of a successful outcome of mediation, “Goal-based 
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approach,” which assesses the degree of success of a certain objective of 
the mediation, seems to be studied the most and many discussions including 
criticisms are available in the literature.
III. Case Studies and Analysis
This part examines the relevance and impact of the major arguments and 
findings of the standard literature on third party mediation of three case studies. 
More precisely, it examines the impact of contextual and process variables on 
the dependent variable. Two other contextual variables, party cohesiveness and 
the international context, are also evaluated as these factors played critical roles 
in the cases in question.
1. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Case
(1) The Nature of the Dispute
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established in 1970 
by a new generation of educated Muslim militant leaders to fight for a Moro 
homeland in the Southern Philippines where most of the Muslim people in the 
country are concentrated. Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines used to 
be overwhelmingly populated by the local Muslims but is now dominated by 
the descendants of Christian settlers who have migrated to the island for the last 
eight decades. 
Since the MNLF was supported by the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), an organization influential for Muslim states, the mediator 
role was taken by member states of the OIC, namely Libya and later by 
Indonesia (Harish, 2005). The two parties, the government of the Republic of 
the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF, concluded the final peace agreement in 
1996, provisions of which included a new autonomy framework for the existing 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (the ARMM). Consequently, the 
MNLF participated in the ARMM elections and the founding chair of the MNLF, 
Nur Misuari, was elected ARMM governor. However, in 2001, Nur Misuari led 
a failed uprising against the central government and armed hostilities between 
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the MNLF and the GRP forces have erupted intermittently since then.
(2) The Impact of Party Cohesiveness
In the context of third party mediation, party cohesiveness refers to the 
capacity of the contending parties to fully commit themselves to the mediation 
process and abide fully by whatever negotiated agreement is eventually reached.
The GRP’s cohesiveness as a negotiating party was largely ensured by 
the fact that the country’s elected president then, Fidel Ramos, was the former 
military head of the armed forces who saw to it that the entire military and 
police forces supported the negotiations process.
This was important because earlier failed attempts to negotiate with the 
MNLF by the Aquino presidency was seen as a weakness of the government by 
significant sectors of the military. Thus, the potential opposition by the military 
to the negotiations process was undercut by the assumption into the presidency 
of a leading general. On the part of the MNLF, the critical negotiations period 
also coincided with the decline in its military and political strength and the 
leadership under Misuari and the rank and file fully supported the negotiations 
process. 
(3) The International Context
The international context had a great impact on the outcome of mediation 
in the case of the MNLF. The OIC, and especially Libya and later Indonesia, 
were active in promoting peace negotiations between the MNLF and the GRP. 
The OIC and its members took advantage of the international context, which 
is dependent on the parties on the OIC and its members. As a strong supporter 
of activities of the MNLF, the OIC was able to pressure the MNLF to accept 
mediation by its member states. As for the GRP, Libya pressured the Marcos 
administration, whose oil supply largely depended on the import from the OPEC 
countries, by threatening to reduce oil supplies, since many OIC countries also 
belong to OPEC (Harish, 2005; Rivera, 2006).
Moreover, the Philippines is geopolitically surrounded by Muslim countries 
38 39
The Effectiveness of Third-Party Mediation 
in Internal Armed Conflicts
which are member states of the OIC. Furthermore, some of the OIC member 
states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, hosted substantial numbers 
of overseas Filipino workers. Thus, the GRP was also careful not to antagonize 
OIC countries hosting significant numbers of overseas contractual Filipino 
workers (Rood, 1998).
(4) The Role of the Mediator
The degree of impartiality of the mediator has a weak impact on the 
outcome of mediation for the MNLF conflict. The mediators of the MNLF case 
were Muslim-dominated countries and powerful members of the OIC, which in 
fact provided political and material support to the MNLF. Hence, the consent of 
the GRP to accept these mediators means relative marginality of the quality of 
impartiality in the case.
The leverage of the mediator very strongly affected the outcome of the 
peace process between the MNLF and the GRP. The two mediators (Libya and 
Indonesia) actively used their leverage as major members of the OIC. Libya 
and the other oil exporting OIC members exerted pressure on the Marcos 
administration through the latter’s dependence on oil. Both Libya and Indonesia 
also pressured the MNLF to abandon its claim for independence and negotiate 
for substantial regional autonomy as an alternative. As a result, negotiations 
between the parties with the presence of mediators became possible and 
eventually led to agreement.
Nevertheless, the mediators did not have enough leverage to support the 
appropriate implementation of the peace agreement. Hence, leverage of the 
mediators had impact on the conclusion of the peace agreement but not on its 
implementation.
The status of the mediators in the case of the MNLF conflict had a very 
strong influence on strengthening their leverage and the outcome. As mentioned 
before, membership of international organizations - especially the OIC - 
increased the leverage that the mediators in question resort to for the mediation. 
Moreover, as equally sovereign states, the mediators were able to negotiate 
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with the GRP as legitimate mediators on the consent of involvement. Due to the 
status of the mediators, the parties were required to respond sincerely to requests 
of the mediators.
(5) Process Variable
Finally, the process condition of mediation for the MNLF conflict had 
very strong impact on the outcome of mediation. Directive and manipulative 
conduct by the mediators obviously had a large influence on the outcome of the 
case. As the main supplier of arms and training for the MNLF, Libya was in a 
very strong position to pressure not only the GRP but also the MNLF. During 
the negotiation, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdelsalem Ali Treki, as a mediator, 
directed negotiations between the two parties in Tripoli in December 1976. 
Other mediators of the OIC and negotiators of the MNLF were reported to be 
submissive to Treki (Harish, 2005). Without being proactive in the mediation 
process, the mediators of the case could not have achieved the final agreement.
2. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Case
(1) The Nature of the Dispute
The MILF is another armed Muslim movement in the Southern Philippines 
that earlier split from the MNLF partly because of Islamic identity issues. In the 
Southern Philippines, the issue of ancestral domain, or Muslims’ claim to their 
traditional homeland, was not resolved by the final peace agreement between 
the MNLF and the GRP. The MILF was not a party to the GRP-MNLF peace 
negotiations and had consistently refused to participate in the ARMM elections, 
as it continued to fight for an independent Muslim homeland in Mindanao. They 
have not stopped fighting against the GRP forces (Bertrand, 2000; Gutierrez & 
Borras, 2004; Yom, 2001).
In January 2001, the new President of the GRP, Macapagal-Arroyo, 
requested that Malaysia mediate the peace talks with the MILF (Santos, 2003, 
p.5). After a long process of peace negotiations mediated by Malaysia, the 
parties finally concluded the negotiation and the formal signing of the agreement 
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was scheduled to be in August 2008.
Notwithstanding the completion of the negotiation over an age-old issue, 
the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled “the memorandum of agreement on 
ancestral domain” between the GRP and the MILF to be unconstitutional and the 
formal signing of the agreement was cancelled. The Senate of the Philippines, 
the local politicians representing Christian populations in Mindanao and the 
opposition political parties were against the signing of the “memorandum,” 
because they were not fully consulted particularly on the issue of ancestral 
domain. The legal opposition also suspected the Arroyo administration of using 
the peace agreement as an entry point for amending the constitution to extend 
her term or shift to a parliamentary system to enable her to continue to hold 
power. With the aborted signing of the negotiated memorandum of agreement on 
ancestral domain, the peace talks between the GRP and the MILF collapsed and 
armed hostilities have resumed (Kohno, 2008, p.2).
(2) The Impact of Party Cohesiveness
Party cohesiveness of the GRP and the MILF had very strong influence on 
the outcome of mediation by Malaysia. Arroyo’s lack of strong support from 
local politicians and Congress, especially its upper house, the Senate, prevented 
her from decisively concluding  the peace talks with the MILF. Moreover, the 
institutional independence of the Supreme Court also illustrates the problem of 
working out a cohesive response on the side of the GRP. 
Thus, the level of cohesiveness of each party exercised very strong impact 
on the outcome of the mediation between the MILF and the GRP. Even while 
Malaysia as mediator had leverage and took an appropriate approach in the 
mediation process, the lack of cohesiveness within the GRP undercut the 
negotiated agreement.
(3) The International Context
The United States committed to provide substantial economic aid to the 
conflict-ridden areas once a peace agreement was concluded between the GRP 
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and the MILF. Thus, both of the parties were motivated to make progress to 
some extent in resolving the conflict (Santos, 2003, p.25; Simon, 2004).
Moreover, in October 2006, Japan started to participate in the International 
Monitoring Team (IMT) led mainly by Malaysia to oversee the observance of 
agreed ceasefire by the parties. As one of the biggest donors of ODA and loans 
to Mindanao, Japan sent a technical expert on socio-economic development to 
join the IMT (Lam, 2007). 
These commitments contributed to maintain the motivation of the parties 
to deal with peace negotiation by offering the expectation to gain support in 
return for successful peace negotiations (Lam, 2007). In fact, the MILF created a 
special body, the Bangsamoro Development Authority (BDA), to coordinate the 
acceptance and implementation of various aid packages. Prospective financial 
and development aid in the region increased motivation of both parties to 
conclude a substantial peace agreement.
(4) The Role of the Mediator
The degree of impartiality had weak impact on the outcome of mediation 
in the case of the MILF conflict. As also seen in the case of the MNLF and GRP, 
impartiality of the mediator is a minor prerequisite of being a mediator. While 
Malaysia is a Muslim-dominated country and a member state of the OIC and 
had given support to the Muslims in Mindanao, its impartiality in the mediation 
process was not an issue. In fact, Malaysia’s reception by both parties was 
highly positive.(1)
The leverage of the mediator had a strong but not decisive influence on the 
outcome of mediation. Enhanced by the effect of its status, as explained in the 
following section, the leverage of Malaysia over the MILF and the GRP seems 
Based on a lecture of Anasarias, Ernesto (Staff of Monitoring Ceasefire in Mindanao, Balay 
Rehabilitation Center) at International Christian University (ICU), Tokyo on 19 October 2007 
and on interviews with Ali, Mohajirin (Peace Panel Secretariat, Member of the MILF) and 
Nograles, Karlo Alexi (Chief of Staff. Office of House Speaker, the Philippines) at National 
Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, on 13 November 2008.
(1)
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to have been a major determinant, but not the decisive factor of the outcome. 
Despite its strong leverage, the Malaysian mediation process was derailed by 
internal political problems especially affecting the GRP over which it had no 
control or influence.
The status of Malaysia as a mediator seems to be an essential prerequisite 
of its leverage. Aside from being an influential OIC member, Malaysia has 
significant political and economic resources that it could use as a mediator. It 
presented itself as a major investor in Mindanao once the conflict is settled. 
It also hosts a significant number of overseas Filipino contractual workers. 
Moreover, its experience in dealing with domestic multi-ethnicity through its 
modernized federal system and its successful system of affirmative actions for 
the hitherto impoverished majority Muslims in Malaysia were also attractive 
models for the MILF (Maragay, 2006; Rapoport, 1996; Rivera, 2006, p.106; 
Santos, 2003, pp.21-23).
(5) Process Variable
The process variables had a very positive impact on the course of the 
mediation procedure. As a mediator, Malaysia played a very active role and 
combined the functions of a communicator, formulator, and manipulator. The 
main feature of the mediation activity of Malaysia was the concurrent conduct of 
hosting, monitoring, and developing the mediation procedures. Malaysia hosted 
talks between the two parties, monitored the implementation of the ceasefire 
by the parties as the lead state member of the International Monitoring Team 
(the IMT), and developed the implementation capability of the parties through 
capacity building measures.(2)
Malaysia also often used shuttle diplomacy, a covert and informal style 
of diplomacy, to maintain communication between the parties even during 
the deadlock or suspension of the negotiation. By leading the IMT, it offered 
necessary conditions for concentration of the parties into negotiation on 
Based on a lecture of Anasarias, Ernesto.(2)
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difficult issues. It also formulated the agenda of negotiations and resolved 
less contentious issues prior to the most divisive issues such as the ancestral 
domain so that the parties could feel progress in their confidence-building and 
keep motivated in negotiations. Finally, Malaysia directed the resolution of 
the conflict in a way that the MILF lifted its claim for independence and tried 
to advance the negotiation by using threat on occasion (Kohno, 2008, p.2; 
Maragay, 2006; Santos, 2003, pp.3-4, 7-8).
3. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Case
(1) The Nature of the Dispute
Seeking the independence of Aceh from Indonesia, the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) had fought the armed forces of 
the Republic of Indonesia for a long time, although mediation had also been 
tried for several times between the two parties (Aspinall, 2005, pp.88-89; 
International Crisis Group, 2006; Ross, 2005, pp.43-44, 47, 49, 50-51). After a 
huge tsunami struck Aceh on 26 December 2004, mediation between the GAM 
and the Indonesian government was undertaken by the Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI), a small NGO led by Martti Ahtisaari, a former president of 
Finland (Aspinall, 2005, pp.vii-viii; Ross, 2005, p.51).
On 15 August 2005, the final peace agreement, or “The Memorandum of 
Understanding,” was signed by the two parties in Helsinki. The contents of the 
“Memorandum” (Helsinki Accord) included provisions to provide autonomy for 
Aceh, a monitoring mission for the implementation of the agreement, dispute 
settlement procedures, and reintegration of the ex-combatants into society. The 
successful implementation of the memorandum provisions was monitored by 
the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) led by the EU and ASEAN countries 
(Ahtisaari, 2005b; Aspinall, 2005, p.42; Crisis Management Initiative, 2005e, 
2005f and 2008g).
(2) The Impact of Party Cohesiveness
The cohesiveness of the parties strongly affected the outcome of mediation 
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between the GAM and the Indonesian government. In 2004, Gen. Yudhoyono 
was elected president of Indonesia and he presided over a positive environment 
for the peace process. The command of both parties to their soldiers to 
respect demobilization and demilitarization of the conflict was successfully 
observed. As in the case of President Ramos, Yudhoyono, a former ranking 
general, maintained sufficient control over the military and ensured the overall 
cohesiveness of the administration to reassure policy consistency in the peace 
negotiation (Aspinall, 2005, pp.vii-viii; Ross, 2005, p.51).
(3) The International Context
The international context played a significant role in the case of Aceh.  The 
huge tsunami on 26 December 2004 which destroyed Aceh compelled  the two 
parties to resume the peace talks. The parties realized that they had to make 
mutual concessions to rescue Aceh. The devastation of Aceh and the massive 
outpouring of international aid created a unique opportunity for the two parties 
to resume peace talks and join hands in reconstructing Aceh (Aspinall, 2005, 
pp.vii-viii; Ross, 2005, p.51).
Moreover, the tsunami also provided the European Union with an 
opportunity to implement its Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP) 
outside its region. As its first CFSP initiative in Southeast Asia, the EU offered 
resources to support the operation of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. This EU 
support vastly facilitated the mediation role of the CMI under Ahtisaari (Aspinall, 
2005, pp.vii-viii; Ross, 2005, p.51).
(4) The Role of the Mediator
The impartiality of the mediator strongly and positively affected the 
progress of mediation by the CMI. It maintained its impartiality throughout the 
negotiation process. The CMI’s proposal for GAM to abandon its claim for full 
independence was seen by GAM as an impartial effort to formulate agreeable 
solutions for both parties. This favorable reception was facilitated by the fact 
that CMI was seen as a small but highly credible NGO with no hidden agenda in 
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mediating the conflict.
The leverage of the mediator was not a strong factor on the outcome of 
the mediation. As already mentioned, CMI had much less leverage than state 
actors, for it is a small NGO. Its expert knowledge and prestigious leadership 
together with the support of the European Union, Finland, and the Netherlands 
certainly enhanced its leverage but these factors were not intrinsic to its status as 
a mediator.
The status of CMI as a mediator strongly affected the outcome of 
mediation. Ahtisaari's personality and established track record as a former head 
of state and diplomat enabled CMI to gather support from other organizations 
and states and command the trust of both parties to the conflict. Though CMI 
was a small NGO, its connection with the European Union and its member states 
provided it with necessary resources and further enhanced its mediating role. 
(5) Process Variables
Finally, the process conditions strongly affected the outcome of mediation 
by CMI. Ahtisaari reportedly acted as a formulator of the agenda of talks that 
facilitated discussions away from the original secessionist demands of GAM 
(Ahtisaari, 2005a; Crisis Management Initiative, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c and 
2005d). The CMI was also active in the implementation phase of the peace 
agreement. 
IV. Findings 
Based on the case studies, the three major standard hypotheses and findings 
in the literature on third party mediation identified earlier can now be evaluated. 
First, between the context and process variables of third-party mediation in 
question in case studies above, the process factor is not less important than 
the contextual factors. On the contrary, the process factor had a very strong 
impact on the outcome of mediation in all the three cases. In all these cases 
the mediators actively took roles as communicators and formulators.  All the 
mediators involved in the cases played active and direct roles up to the point 
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where the formal peace agreements were concluded even while the subsequent 
outcomes differ from case to case.
Second, among the contextual factors of third-party mediation in 
aformentioned case studies of internal armed conflicts, the party cohesiveness 
and the international context seem to be much more influential to the final 
outcome of mediation than was expected. Party cohesiveness and the 
international context had a great impact on the outcome of mediation. In the 
cases of the MNLF and Aceh, presidential influence and control over the 
military ensured enough cohesiveness by the governmental side to keep the 
mediation process on the right track by assuring observance of implementation 
of the agreement by the government. In contrast, in the MILF case, the lack of 
cohesiveness on the side of the government in terms of the support for Arroyo’s 
presidential decision-making undercut the formal signing of the negotiated 
memorandum of agreement.
The international context had great impact on all the three cases. The 
leverage of the mediator was highly dependent on the parties’ dependence on the 
OIC countries as an international context in the case of the MNLF. Expectations 
for prospective aid after the final peace agreement stimulated both parties 
to make progress in the negotiations in the case of the MILF. International 
concern for Aceh after a disastrous tsunami provided powerful conditions and 
opportunities for both parties to make concessions on their demands to prioritize 
the rehabilitation of the Acehnese people.
As predicted by the standard literature, among the characteristics of the 
mediator, the status and leverage factors may exercise the greatest influence on 
the final outcome of mediation while impartiality of the mediator the least. The 
case studies also indicate that the status and leverage of the mediator are closely 
interlinked and hence have to be considered together. In both the GRP-MNLF 
and GRP-MILF cases, the important source of leverage of the mediators comes 
from their status as influential members of the OIC. In the Indonesia-Aceh case, 
the CMI was able to compensate for its relatively low leverage with its status as 
an NGO with strong linkages to the EU, enhanced also by the status of its well-
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known leader, former Finnish president Ahtisaari. 
Furthermore, as a new finding of this research, the conceptualization of the 
impact of leverage needs to be analyzed using at least three levels: the leverage 
to initiate the mediation process, leverage to conclude the peace agreement, 
and leverage to implement the contents of the peace agreement. Thus, in the 
case of the GRP-MNLF mediation, the mediator had leverage to initiate and 
conclude the mediation process but lacked the leverage to oversee or monitor 
the implementation of the key contents of the peace agreement. In the case of 
the GRP-MILF mediation process, the leverage of the mediator was effective 
from the initiation to the conclusion of the negotiated agreement but was 
helpless in preventing the aborted signing of the agreement due to the serious 
problem of the lack of party cohesiveness on the government side. In the case 
of the Indonesia-GAM mediation, the EU-backed leverage of the mediator 
was felt through all the three stages, a process enhanced by the confluence the 
international context and the strong party cohesiveness of the contending parties. 
V. Conclusion
The findings of this research based on three case studies show some 
interesting variations on the three major hypotheses and findings of the standard 
literature on the factors involved in effective third party mediation in internal 
armed conflicts.
First, the process conditions or variables play at least as important a role as 
the contextual variables. How the mediator selects, combines and accentuates its 
role as a communicator, formulator, and manipulator of the mediation process is 
a major factor in determining the outcome of the process. 
Second, among the contextual variables, the impact of party cohesiveness 
and the international context need to be carefully analyzed together with the 
characteristics of the mediator. In the standard literature, the characteristics 
of the mediator oftentimes command the most attention as the most important 
contextual variable. However, the case studies show that both party cohesiveness 
and the international context are essential contextual variables that can not be 
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underplayed. 
Finally, as predicted and assumed by the standard literature, among 
the factors of characteristics of the mediator, impartiality is not the most 
important. Rather, the status and leverage of the mediator are more important 
in determining the final outcome of the process. Moreover, the  leverage of the 
mediator can be analyzed at three substantive levels of the mediation process: 
the initiation phase, the conclusion of the agreement, and the implementation of 
the agreement.
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The Effectiveness of Third-Party Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts:
Cases of Mindanao and Aceh
<Summary>
Takeshi ODAIRA
What are the factors of effective third-party mediation in internal armed 
conflict in the contemporary world? To answer this research question, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 1) The contextual factors are more 
influential than the process factor to the final outcome of mediation; 2) Among 
the contextual factors of third-party mediation in internal armed conflicts, the 
characteristics of the mediator are the most influential to the final outcome of 
mediation; 3) Among the characteristics of the mediator, the leverage of the 
mediator exercises the greatest influence on the final outcome of mediation 
while the impartiality of the mediator the least.
To examine these hypotheses, two cases from the Southern Philippines (the 
MNLF and MILF) and one case from Indonesia (Aceh) are examined. These are 
all international third-party mediation in internal armed conflicts between the 
secessionist Islamic rebels and the ASEAN member states.
The findings of the research diverge from what the proposed hypotheses 
asserted on the relationship between the effectiveness of mediation and its 
factors influencing it, though many researchers asserted their relevance.
First, the process conditions or variables play at least an important a role as 
the contextual variables. How the mediator selects, combines and accentuates its 
role as a communicator, formulator, and manipulator of the mediation process 
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is a major factor in determining the outcome of the process. Since case studies 
revealed that active engagement of the mediator in the mediation process as well 
as its conditioning of the appropriate context of negotiations and implementation 
phase have a valid effect on the progress of mediation process and its outcome, 
the process variable needs to be treated at least as important as the contextual 
variables in assessing the effectiveness of a certain case of mediation.
Second, among the contextual variables, the impact of party cohesiveness 
and the international context need to be carefully analyzed together with the 
characteristics of the mediator. In the standard literature, the characteristics 
of the mediator oftentimes command the most attention as the most important 
contextual variable. However, the case studies show that both party cohesiveness 
and the international context are essential contextual variables that can not 
be underplayed. Cohesiveness of the government side in the MNLF and the 
Aceh case made contrast with the case of the MILF, in which Arroyo did not 
maintain cohesiveness and failed to sign the agreement. In the MNLF case, the 
presence of the OIC affected much the conducts of the parties. In the MILF 
case, expectations for more aid in return for the peace agreement stimulated 
motivation of the parties. In Aceh case, international concern for Aceh due to the 
tsunami was indispensable to make the parties invovled in mediation process. 
Although these two variables were not covered by the proposed hypotheses, 
significance of these are among essential findings of the research.
Finally, as predicted and assumed by the standard literature, among 
the factors of characteristics of the mediator, impartiality is not the most 
important. Rather, the status and leverage of the mediator are more important 
in determining the final outcome of the process. Moreover, the leverage of the 
mediator can be analyzed at three substantive levels of the mediation process: 
the initiation phase, the conclusion of the agreement, and the implementation 
of the agreement. In the case of the MNLF and the MILF, the mediators had 
enough leverage to initiate and conclude the peace negotiations among the 
parties, but not enough leverage to implement, while the mediator of the Aceh 
case had sufficient leverage in all the three categories.
